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321 
CRISIS, CONTINUITY, AND CHANGE IN 
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 
Valentina Vadi* 
“Strive not Leuconoe! To know what end 
The gods above to me, or thee, will send. 
. . . Whilst we are talking, envious time doth slide,  








Can international law embrace the fluidity of time and successfully 
manage change? The debate over continuity and change lies at the heart of 
international law, which seeks to foster peaceful, just, and prosperous rela-
tions among nations.
3
 International law endeavors to govern the future by 
applying, in the present, the legal heritage of the past. Nonetheless, every-
thing flows, and in an ever-changing world, some change is needed within 
the international legal system to ensure its stability, especially in times of 
crisis. Not only can crises constitute “catalyst[s] for the development of in-
ternational law,” but they can test, undermine, or ultimately buttress the 
structure of international law.
4
 
The issue of continuity and change in international law has traditionally 
been framed as a dialectical oscillation between the basic pillar of interna-
tional law, the principle of pacta sunt servanda (treaties should be complied 
 
 * Professor of International Economic Law, Lancaster University Law School, Unit-
ed Kingdom. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the webinar “Government Re-
sponse to the Pandemic: Balancing Public Health and Investment Protection,” online Invest-
ment Treaty Forum, organized by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 
held on May 7, 2020. The author wishes to thank Professor Caroline Foster, Ellen Aldin, 
Katherine Boothroyd, Grace Brody, Farshad Rahimi Dizgovin, Emeline Kong, and Samantha 
Franks for useful comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
 1. HORACE’S ODES: ENGLISH AND IMITATED BY VARIOUS HANDS 19 (Charles F. W. 
Cooper ed., Sir Thomas Hawkins trans., 1880) (quoting Book I, Ode 11). 
 2. W.B. Yeats, Gratitude to the Unknown Instructors, in W.B. YEATS, COLLECTED 
POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 254 (Richard J. Finneran ed., rev. 2d ed. 1996).  
 3. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 278–280 (2011). 
 4. Hilary Charlesworth, International Law: A Discipline of Crisis, 65 MOD. L. REV. 
377, 382 (2002). 
322 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:321 
 
with), and its classical antagonist, the rebus sic stantibus clause (or funda-
mental change of circumstances). In principle, treaties govern international 
relations, and their permanence enables the stability, legal certainty, predict-
ability, and functioning of the international system. A certain degree of flex-
ibility, however, is often necessary to maintain a balance between the rights 
and obligations within a treaty. In times of crisis, extraordinary times call 
for extraordinary measures. 
This article explores the connection between continuity and change in 
international law by investigating how this interaction unfolds in interna-
tional investment law and arbitration. In particular, it uses the coronavirus 
pandemic as a focus for analysis. The coronavirus pandemic constitutes a 
yet unresolved global crisis that poses many challenges to states and inter-
national organizations alike. Although pandemics are not unprecedented, 
they amount to the paradigmatic examples of life-threatening crises, requir-
ing the adoption of new ways of thinking and novel solutions in different 
areas of the law. Therefore, such a crisis will somehow influence the devel-
opment of international law in general and international investment law in 
particular. It will necessarily determine both continuity and change, “of-
fer[ing] a lens” through which the balance between continuity and change 
can be observed.
5
 The article seeks to answer the following question: can 
international investment law successfully address the challenges posed by 
the coronavirus crisis? Or will the pandemic “change the world of interna-
tional arbitration as we know it”?
6
 In dealing with these questions, the arti-
cle provides an overview of the issues that may arise at the intersection of 
public health and international investment law. It highlights ways in which 
international investment law can contribute to the development of interna-
tional law and ensuring the right balance between continuity and change. 
The ongoing health crisis has “ended and upended lives around the 
globe.”
7
 As of January 24, 2021, COVID-19, the disease caused by corona-
virus,
8




 5. Id. at 377.  
 6. Gary L. Benton, How Will the Coronavirus Impact International Arbitration? 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG, (Mar. 13, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/03
/13/how-will-the-coronavirus-impact-international-arbitration/?print=pdf. 
 7. Katharina Pistor, Introduction, in LAW IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 xi (Katharina 
Pistor ed., 2020). 
 8. COVID-19 indicates the disease caused by a new strain of coronavirus that previ-
ously had not been identified in humans, called the severe acute respiratory syndrome corona-
virus 2 (SARS-Cov2). See Coronavirus, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health-
topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1 (last visited Nov. 6, 2020) (reporting “Most people infected 
with the COVID-19 virus will experience mild to moderate respiratory illness and recover 
without requiring special treatment.  Older people, and those with underlying medical prob-
lems like cardiovascular disease, diabetes, chronic respiratory disease, and cancer are more 
likely to develop serious illness.”). 
 9. Weekly Operational Update on COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 24, 2021), 
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-reports. 
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many more cases may be unreported or undetected due to the scale and fea-
tures of the pandemic. The World Health Organization (“WHO”) declared 
the virus a public health emergency of international concern on January 30, 
2020, which marks it “an extraordinary event” that is “serious, unusual or 
unexpected” and may require international action.
10
 On March 11, 2020, the 
WHO declared it a pandemic.
11
 The U.N. Secretary-General, Antonio Gu-
terres, warned that the world today is facing the most challenging crisis 
since World War II
12
 and that COVID-19 represents “the fight of a genera-
tion” and a “threat to world peace and security.”
13
 
In response to the pandemic, states have adopted a wide range of public 
health policies. Such measures include taking control of private property; 
imposing price caps or suspending utility payments; compelling private 
companies to produce certain goods; closing non-essential businesses; clos-
ing borders; and impeding the flow of people, goods, and services. Govern-
ments have placed cities, regions, and entire countries under lockdown. 
Moreover, the social and economic consequences of the pandemic may re-
quire further regulatory measures in the future.
14
  
These public health measures have brought economic life to a near 
standstill and have inevitably affected many foreign investors. Import bans, 
quarantine measures, travel restrictions can particularly affect business with 
an international core. Investment treaties typically include a range of sub-
stantive standards of protection, including the prohibition of unlawful ex-
propriation, the fair and equitable treatment standard, and the principle of 
non-discrimination.
15
 Such standards may now become the basis for investor 
claims against state measures. Indeed, some investors will likely file claims 
against states before arbitral tribunals for breaches of international invest-
ment treaties. If investors can demonstrate breaches of substantive treaty 
provisions, states, in turn, will use defenses that are either based on the ap-
 
 10. Statement on the Second Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) 
Emergency Committee Regarding the Outbreak of Novel Coronavirus, WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., (Jan. 30,  2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-
second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-
regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov). 
11 WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19, WORLD 
HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-
s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19—-11-march-2020. 
 12. Coronavirus: Greatest Test Since World War Two, Says UN Chief, BBC NEWS 
(Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52114829. 
 13. Helen Davidson, Coronavirus Threat to Global Peace and Stability, UN Chief 
Warns, GUARDIAN (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/10
/coronavirus-threat-to-global-peace-and-stability-un-chief-warns. 
 14. Eric Richardson & Colleen Devine, Emergencies End Eventually: How to Better 
Analyze Human Rights Restrictions Sparked by the COVID-19 Pandemic Under the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 MICH. J. INT’L L. 105 (2021). 
 15. See generally DAVID COLLINS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW (2016). 
324 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:321 
 
plicable treaty or those generally available under customary international 
law. Arbitral tribunals will have to assess how states treated foreign inves-
tors and their investments in this crisis. Should an investor seek relief in the 
context of a global pandemic that arguably requires states to adopt econom-
ically harmful measures to serve the best interest of the world population as 
a whole? Can governments avoid or minimize violations of international in-
vestment law when responding to the pandemic? How should arbitral tribu-
nals adjudicate pandemic-related claims? 
This article examines some of the most pressing legal issues raised by 
the pandemic for international investment law and arbitration. It does not 
provide legal advice, but instead identifies and discusses crucial legal issues 
and provides guidance to policymakers about the legal challenges ahead. It 
proceeds as follows. After having identified some of the key pressing issues 
in Part I, Part II briefly addresses a range of procedural matters. Part III then 
focuses on substantive aspects, namely, the kinds of claims that can be filed. 
Part IV further explores specific flexibility mechanisms, that is, state de-
fenses. In this way, the article provides an overview of the issues that may 
arise at the intersection of public health and international investment law 
and highlights simple ways in which international investment law can con-
tribute to the development of international law and ensuring the right bal-
ance between continuity and change. The article ultimately concludes that 
both continuity and change are necessary for ensuring the health and wealth 
of nations and justice among them. 
II.  PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
Due to the specific features of the ongoing pandemic, namely the fact 
that possible modes of transmission for SARS-CoV-2 include droplet and 
airborne transmission, virtual proceedings have become more and more 
common.
16
 Virtual proceedings in investment arbitration have already been 
used in the past decade.
17
 Indeed, several proceedings before arbitral tribu-
nals have long been performed at a distance, whether telephonically or 
online.
18
 The rationale for the early adoption of technological innovation in 
arbitration was largely one of “economy in time and cost.” Such innovation 
has also indirectly reduced the sector’s carbon footprint.
19
 According to 
 
 16. Transmission of SARS-CoV-2: Implications for Infection Prevention Precautions, 
Scientific Brief, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room
/commentaries/detail/transmission-of-sars-cov-2-implications-for-infection-prevention-
precautions. 
 17. See George Bermann, Dispute Resolution in Pandemic Circumstances, in LAW IN 
THE TIME OF COVID-19 167, 168–69 (Katherina Pistor ed., 2020). 
 18. Id. at 168. 
 19. Lucy Greenwood & Kabir A.N. Duggal, The Green Pledge: No Talk, More Action, 
KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Mar. 20, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/03
/20/the-green-pledge-no-talk-more-action/?print=print. 
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Berman, the present pandemic is only hastening arbitration’s change “down 
a path it was destined to travel anyway.”
20
 While arbitral institutions revise 
their rules every several years, the ongoing pandemic has accelerated the 
existing trends in investment arbitration, such as increasing use of electronic 
communication. In 2019 alone, about sixty percent of the 200 hearings and 
sessions organized under the aegis of the International Center for the Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) were held via video-conference.
21
 
The ICSID and other arbitral institutions have developed video-conference 
systems for individual arbitrators’ service and have secured cloud-based 
file-sharing platforms for their cases.
22
 
Many major arbitral institutions have also continued their operations 
during the crisis. For example, the ICSID, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (“ICC”), the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (“SCC”), the London Court of International Arbitration 
(“LCIA”), and the Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre (“HKIAC”) 
all remain operational at the time of this writing, having implemented re-




Several arbitral rules explicitly enable tribunals to conduct hearings re-
motely.
24
 Leading arbitral institutions have thus gradually promoted the use 
of online tools. For instance, the ICSID has published a guide to online 
hearings.
25
 The ICC has also recently issued a Guidance Note, including “a 
checklist for a virtual hearing protocol that will ensure each party is treated 
equally and given a full opportunity to present its case.”
26
 The note illus-
trates the procedural tools available to them “to mitigate the delays generat-
ed by the pandemic” and “provides guidance concerning the organi[z]ation 
of conferences and hearings in light of COVID-19 considerations, including 
 
 20. Bermann, supra note 17, at 174. 
 21. Id. at 169. 
 22. See id. at 169–70. 
 23. Conducting International Arbitrations During the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.debevoise.com/insights/publications
/2020/04/conducting-international-arbitrations-during-covid. 
 24. See, e.g., International Chamber of Commerce [“ICC”] Arbitration Rules art. 24 ¶ 1 
(2017); London Court of International Arbitration [“LCIA”] Arbitration Rules art. 19 ¶ 2 
(2014).  
 25. International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes [“ICSID”], A Brief 
Guide to Online Hearings at ICSID, ICSID NEWS & EVENTS (Mar. 24, 2020), https:
//icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/News.aspx?CID=362. 
 26. Yvonne Mak, Do Virtual Hearings Without Parties’ Agreement Contravene Due 
Process?  The View from Singapore, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (June 20, 2020), http:
//arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/06/20/do-virtual-hearings-without-parties-
agreement-contravene-due-process-the-view-from-singapore/.   
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conducting such conferences and hearings by audioconference, video-
conference, or other similar means of communication.”
27
 
Virtual proceedings clearly pose specific challenges. The growing digi-
talization of the arbitral process will likely not affect the written stage of ar-
bitration proceedings as much as it will affect oral hearings, which often in-
volve multiple participants. The organization of online proceedings can face 
several difficulties, including participating parties being present in several 
different time zone and selecting arbitrators and legal teams who are com-
fortable with remote technology. Potential technological failures and con-
nectivity issues also must be taken into account. Some flexibility is neces-
sary to accommodate possible delays in the issuance of awards due to the 
impossibility of site visits, the lack of access to paper files stored in physical 
offices, and the potential for possible sudden changes in the availability of 
lawyers, arbitrators, and clerks. 
Various concerns have also arisen concerning the cybersecurity of vid-
eo arbitrations.
28
 While conducting hearings virtually, parties may work 
from home on unsecured networks.
29
 Hackers could “launch cyber-attacks 
on new and vulnerable remote working infrastructure and hijack video con-
ference calls.”
30
 Lack of adequate cybersecurity in international investment 
arbitration can “affect the integrity of the arbitral process and expose confi-
dential and commercially sensitive information.”
31
 The convenience of easy-
to-use tech products should not be prioritized over fundamental issues such 
as data security and privacy. The security architecture of tech products must 
be ascertained before adopting them as communication platforms.
32
 For this 
reason, arbitral venues such as ICSID are developing their own platforms to 
protect privacy and confidentiality. Several arbitral institutions, including 
ICC, have published guidance on data protection and cybersecurity.
33
 
Other important concerns around virtual proceedings relate to their ef-
fect on due process.
34
 While there is a desire to run arbitrations efficiently, 
arbitrators and parties should carefully consider the implications of online 
proceedings for the parties’ right to due process, which requires that the par-
 
 27. INT’L CHAMBER COM., ICC GUIDANCE NOTE ON POSSIBLE MEASURES AIMED AT 
MITIGATING THE EFFECTS OF THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC (2020). 
 28. Myfanwy Wood & Lucy McKenzie, Arbitration and COVID-19: Cybersecurity 
and Data Protection, ASHURST (July 8, 2020), https://www.ashurst.com/en/news-and-insights
/legal-updates/arbitration-and-covid-19—-cybersecurity-and-data-protection. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Brian X. Chen, The Lesson We are Learning from Zoom, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/article/zoom-privacy-lessons.html. 
 33. See, e.g., INT’L CHAMBER COM., ICC COMMISSION REPORT: INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 15 (2017) https://iccwbo.org/content
/uploads/sites/3/2017/03/icc-information-technology-in-international-arbitration-icc-
arbitration-adr-commission.pdf; see also Wood & McKenzie, supra note 28. 
 34. Mak, supra note 26. 
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ties be treated fairly and granted a reasonable opportunity to present their 
case. Concerns have arisen regarding counsels’ and arbitrators’ ability to 
assess witness credibility in virtual testimony.
35
 In addition, there are con-
cerns related to a party’s inability to consult with counsel in real time.
36
 
Cross-examination may also be complicated to administer through vid-
eoconference.
37
 For instance, “it is nearly impossible to ensure that the fact 
witness is not accompanied by someone unauthorized in the room during 
the hearing.”
38
 Only authorized persons can participate in hearings, unless 
these are public. Moreover, the party who had objected to a virtual hearing 
may later apply to set aside the award.
39
 Perceived procedural imperfections 
can be caused by technical issues or an inadequate internet connection. All 
of these issues may create grounds for the losing party to challenge a ren-
dered award. The losing party may oppose the enforcement of the resulting 
award under article V of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (hereinafter the New York Conven-
tion), arguing a violation of due process.
40
 A party to an ICSID arbitration 
may similarly seek annulment of the award, invoking a serious departure 
from a fundamental rule of procedure.
41
  Reportedly, Spain has challenged 
an ICSID tribunal decision to hold virtual hearings.
42
 
In conclusion, parties to arbitrations should seriously consider whether 
and to what extent to conduct their arbitrations online. And the arbitral tri-
bunal should take the preferences and concerns of the parties into account 
when deciding whether to conduct a hearing virtually. While there is a risk 
that the parties may attempt to delay proceedings by refusing to nominate a 
tribunal, appear in hearings, or respond to the tribunal’s requests, arbitral 
tribunals should nonetheless be sensitive to the parties’ requests given the 
extraordinary circumstances and conduct a case-by-case assessment. In 
 
 35. Virtual Hearings–the New Normal, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Mar. 27, 2020), https:
//globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1222421/virtual-hearings-%E2%80%93-the-new-
normal. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Ahmed Bakry, The COVID-19 Crisis and Investment Arbitration: A Reflection from 
the Developing Countries, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr. 21, 2020), http:/arbitrationblog.
/kluwerarbitration.com/2020/04/21/the-covid-19-crisis-and-investment-arbitration-a-
reflection-from-the-developing-countries/. 
 39. Mak, supra note 26. 
 40. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards  
art. 5, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 41. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals 
of Other States art. 52(1)(d), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (entered 
into force Oct. 14, 1966). 
 42. Cosmo Sanderson, ICSID Panel Challenged Over Decision to Hold Virtual Hear-
ing, GLOB. ARB. REV. (Aug. 14, 2020), https://globalarbitrationreview.com/article/1230019
/icsid-panel-challenged-over-decision-to-hold-virtual-hearing.  
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striking the right balance between continuity and change, they should focus 
on both the efficiency and the fairness of their decision on the matter. 
III.  INVESTMENT TREATY CLAIMS 
In the context of a pandemic, states have traditionally adopted measures 
that have affected their citizens’ way of life and productivity. The closure of 
borders, quarantine measures, travel bans, and lockdowns can severely af-
fect businesses. Should an investor seek relief in the context of a global 
pandemic that arguably requires states to adopt such measures to protect 
public health? In order to address this question, this article looks at three 
perspectives in this subsection: moral, economic, and legal. From a moral 
perspective, the current crisis is affecting the most vulnerable members of 
societies all across the globe, and endorsing solidarity can help the interna-
tional community to overcome the crisis successfully and become more re-
silient. Therefore, these times may present an opportunity for companies to 
be socially conscious. Companies’ voluntary contributions to fight the pan-
demic have been welcome, demonstrating that both domestic and foreign 
investors can play a key role in the fight against the pandemic.
43
 
From an economic perspective, many companies will have to rebuild 
their businesses and may wish to minimize the time spent on litigation, 
which can be time-consuming, unpredictable, and expensive. Before filing 
claims, companies should seriously consider the possible backlash, negative 
publicity, and waste of time that may result from such claims. They should 
also ponder whether filing an investment treaty claim makes sense, given 
the unpredictability of the outcome and the high expenses involved. In fact, 
a deluge of arbitrations risks not only placing a strain on the system of in-
ternational dispute resolution but could also prevent the adoption of more 
constructive solutions. 
Several investment treaties include cooling-off clauses, which require 
investors to attempt to reach a settlement with a state before filing an arbi-
tration.
44
 In this scenario, investors should consider alternative dispute set-
tlement mechanisms such as mediation and conciliation. The use of such al-
 
 43. Some of these efforts have made headlines. Ellie Violet Bramley, Prada the Latest 
Fashion Brand to Make Medical Face Masks, GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2020) (reporting that a 
number of big fashion companies have turned their efforts towards the fight against the Coro-
navirus, producing medical face masks); Andrew Scott, Formula 1 Teams, Carmakers and 
Aviation Groups Race To Meet Ventilation Challenge, FORBES (Mar. 25 2020) (reporting that 
several carmakers cooperated with ventilator manufacturers to help to boost production of the 
life-saving machines that were urgently needed in the crisis). 
 44. E.g., Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador 
Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment art. VI(2), Ecuador-
U.S., Aug. 27, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103–15 (“In the event of an investment dispute, the 
parties to the dispute should initially seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If 
the dispute cannot be settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to 
submit the dispute, under one of the following alternatives, for resolution.”). 
Winter 2021] International Investment Law and Arbitration 329 
 
ternative dispute resolution mechanisms in lieu of litigation or arbitration 
could reduce transaction costs, lead to contract renegotiation, and/or pro-
duce other positive, mutually agreeable, and successful outcomes in a short 
timeframe.
45
 Such mechanisms enable the parties to reach creative outcomes 
that will allow a mutual win, thus permitting the continuation of viable in-
vestor-state relations rather than bringing them to an end.
46
 
Finally, from a legal perspective, the mistreatment of aliens by a host 
state may give rise to responsibility on the international plane.
47
 However, 
state responsibility does not arise out of every incident in which a foreign 
investor has suffered losses. Investment treaties are not insurance policies 
against bad business decisions in uncertain times. Rather, state responsibil-
ity arises when the host state has fallen short of its international law obliga-
tions. If investors have sound claims to assert or claims to defend, the arbi-
tral process can ensure access to justice.
48
 Investors can thereby challenge 
measures that are in breach of investment treaties before arbitral tribunals. 
Investors should not, however, abuse the arbitral process. Meritless claims 
harm the relationship between the parties; they are unlikely to be successful, 
and even if they are, the awards may not be enforced on public policy 
grounds. 
Practitioners Lucas Bento and Jingtian Chen have raised the possibility 
of establishing a multilateral treaty claims solution or shared compensation 
schemes.
49
 The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment and some 
scholars have called for a moratorium or waiver permanently restricting all 
arbitration claims related to state measures coping with the pandemic.
50
 The 
eventual ratification of a multilateral instrument could constitute a solid le-
gal basis for such global cooperation. A moratorium on investment claims 
can enable governments to adopt regulatory measures without the fear of 
 
 45. See August Reinisch & Loretta Malintoppi, Methods of Dispute Resolution, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW (Peter Muchlinski, Federico Or-
tino & Christoph Schreuer eds., 2008).  
 46. Jane Croft & Kate Beioley, Call to Give Companies ‘Breathing Space’ on Corona-
virus Litigation, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2020) (reporting that Lord Neuberger and Lord Phillips, 
both former Presidents of the UK Supreme Court, encouraged parties to focus on concilia-
tion).  
 47. Kaj Hober, State Responsibility and Investment Arbitration, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 545, 
562 (2008). 
 48. See Francesco Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International In-
vestment Law,  EUR. J. INT’L L. 729, 731, (2009). 
 49. Lucas Bento & Jingtian Chen, Investment Treaty Claims in Pandemic Times: Po-
tential Claims and Defenses, KLUWER ARB. BLOG (Apr.8 2020), http://arbitration
blog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/04/08/investment-treaty-claims-in-pandemic-times-
potential-claims-and-defenses/. 
 50. Call for ISDS Moratorium During COVID-19 Crisis and Response, COLUM. CTR. 
ON SUSTAINABLE INV. (May 6, 2020), http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2020/05/05/isds-moratorium-
during-covid-19/. 
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lawsuits (the so-called regulatory chill).
51
 Such claims would distract gov-
ernments from the management of the COVID-19 crisis.
52
 Finally, damages 
awarded under investment claims “would weigh heavily against the dire 
budget crises facing developing countries in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic.”
53
 Nonetheless, whether states will be willing to establish such 
schemes remains unclear. Capital exporting countries may be reticent to 
adopt such a moratorium, as it could affect the interests of their domestic 
companies. More fundamentally, scholars caution against “creeping authori-
tarianism,” arguing that states should not “abuse their regulatory powers to 
the detriment of foreign investors.”
54
 
The section briefly explores the primary substantive treaty standards 
that could act as the basis for claims arising out of state measures adopted to 
fight the pandemic, namely fair and equitable treatment, non-discrimination, 
and expropriation. The section demonstrates that international investment 
treaties include vague treaty provisions. On the one hand, this vagueness 
constitutes a risk because there is uncertainty about how arbitral tribunals 
may interpret such provisions. On the other hand, such ambiguity could also 
amount to an opportunity because it provides inherent flexibility to interna-
tional investment treaties. The tribunals’ interpretation will be crucial in 
preserving the delicate balance between continuity and change within the 
system. 
A.  Fair and Equitable Treaty Claims 
The fair and equitable treatment (“FET”) standard is nearly ubiquitous 
in investment treaties.
55
 Although there is no commonly accepted definition 
of this standard, it is generally deemed to include access to justice, due pro-
cess, good faith, and respect of legitimate expectations of investors.
56
 The 




Investors may contend that state measures violate due process, are un-
reasonable or disproportionate, and/or dramatically alter the existing legal 
 
 51. Prabhash Ranjan, Covid-19 and ISDS Moratorium—An Indiscreet Proposal, 
OPINIO JURIS (June 15, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/06/15/covid-19-and-isds-
moratorium-an-indiscreet-proposal/. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See JESWALD W. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 218 (1st ed. 
2009). 
 56. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev. [“UNCTAD”], Fair and Equitable Treatment 12, 
53, 80, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/5 (Feb. 2012).  
 57. See id. at 58. 
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framework, in breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard.
58
 Howev-
er, the fair and equitable treatment standard does not require states to freeze 
their legal framework.
59
 On the contrary, it can accommodate the regulatory 
change.
60
 Due process generally indicates a lack of arbitrariness in decision-
making and access to legal remedies.
61
 The International Court of Justice 
distinguished arbitrariness from unlawfulness in international law as fol-
lows: 
[I]t must be borne in mind that the fact that an act of a public au-
thority may have been unlawful in municipal law does not neces-
sarily mean that that act was unlawful in international law, as a 
breach of treaty or otherwise. . . .To identify arbitrariness with mere 
unlawfulness would be to deprive it of any useful meaning in its 
own right. Nor does it follow that an act was unjustified, or unrea-
sonable, or arbitrary that, that act is necessarily to be classed as ar-
bitrary in international law, though the qualification given to the 




The Court added that “[a]rbitrariness is not so much something opposed to a 
rule of law, as something opposed to the rule of law. . . It is a wilful [sic] 
disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a 
sense of judicial property.”
63
 Provided that a state granted an alien access to 
its courts and justice was properly administered with adequate procedures, 
there would be no breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
If states first adopted mild responses to the crisis and later intensified 
such responses, investors may claim that such drastic measures violate the 
FET standard because of the regulatory change.
64
 However, since the begin-
ning of the crisis, all countries around the globe have unavoidably adjusted 
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%0D/italaw7417.pdf. 
 59. EDF (Services) Ltd. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award, ¶ 217 (Oct. 
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 While there was very little information available about the 
virus and the related diseases at the beginning of the pandemic, state author-
ities slowly confirmed that the virus could transmit from human to human, 
and states came to discover other features of the virus.
66
 Governments were, 
therefore, forced to respond to the gradual flow of information provided by 
scientists. As such, it would be unreasonable to presume that states could or 
should maintain mild responses as the crisis intensified; instead, it is only 
reasonable to expect that states could temper their responses. 
Most tribunals do not employ proportionality type of reasoning for 
evaluating the breach of fair and equitable treatment.
67
 Nonetheless, because 
some scholars have advocated the use of such analysis in investment arbitra-
tion, and such investigation has surfaced in some arbitrations, it seems ap-
propriate to assess whether the proportionality test could be useful in ascer-
taining whether states have breached the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. The coronavirus crisis also reveals that the proportionality test is 
inappropriate to assess public health measures because of the dynamic 
spread of the pandemic.
68
 Some examples may clarify this point. When New 
Zealand faced its first cases of COVID-19, it opted for “going hard and go-
ing early.”
69
 Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern “imposed a fourteen-day quar-
antine on anyone entering the country on March 14 and implemented a strict 
lockdown two weeks later, when fewer than 150 people had been infected 
and none had died.”
70
 This action could look disproportionate if one looked 
at the number of casualties; nonetheless, it proved to be reasonable in light 
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of the public interest pursued by state policy.
71
 As a result of its policies, 
New Zealand has recorded only twenty-six deaths.
72
 Even before it had any 
confirmed case, Vietnam took drastic measures to prepare for mysterious 
pneumonia.
73
 When the first case was established, the country activated its 
emergency plan, restricting travel, closing the border with China, increasing 
health checks at the border, and closing schools.
74
 While the measures 
“seemed to be quite extreme at the time,” they “were subsequently shown to 
be rather sensible” given their success in halting the spread of the disease.
75
 
In both examples, the state measures have not only saved thousands of lives 
but have also enabled the respective countries to reopen earlier than many 
other states. Counter-intuitively, a more gradual action might have led to a 
disproportionate number of deaths. In countries like Italy, where the virus 
spread before the implementation of any lockdown, the mortality rate 
soared.
76
 Thus, governments can legitimately adopt precautionary approach-
es to prevent the spread of the pandemic, rather than wait for the worst to 
come.
77
 However, if given states and tribunals adopted the proportionality 
criterion, it is worth considering pairing such a strict test with some defer-
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 For instance, in Philip Morris, the majority accepted that a margin of 
appreciation, that is, some deference should be granted: “The responsibility 
for public health measures rests with the government and investment tribu-
nals should pay great deference to governmental judgments of national 
needs in matters such as the protection of public health.”
79
 
Provided that the adopted measures are rational and reasonable, arbitral 
tribunals should not second guess measures adopted during a pandemic; ra-
ther, they could presume their compatibility with the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.
80
 The existence of international standards can provide a 
useful benchmark in assessing whether measures are reasonable and thus 
comply with the fair and equitable treatment provision. For instance, the In-
ternational Health Regulations (“IHR”), the successor to the International 
Sanitary Regulations, can constitute a useful benchmark. Such Regulations 
aim to “prevent, protect against, control and provide a public health re-
sponse to the international spread of disease.”
81
 The IHR, which required 
only a two-thirds majority vote in the World Health Assembly, became 
binding for all WHO Member States as no state opted out.
82
 In 1969, the 
IHR only addressed cholera, plague, and yellow fever.
83
 However, the need 
to expand their coverage has recently emerged due to the appearance of new 
diseases and increased travel and trade in past decades.
84
 To this end, since 
their 2005 revision, in force since 2007, the regulations “are no longer lim-
ited to specific diseases, but apply more generally to health risks.”
85
 Under 
the IHR, the States Parties must: 
 [s]trengthen and maintain the capacity to detect, report, and re-
spond rapidly to public health risks of international concern; to re-
spond to requests for verification of information about potential 
public health emergencies; to assess international health risks and 
notify WHO promptly of these risks; to carry out inspections and 
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control activities at points of entry; and to implement appropriate 
measures recommended by WHO.
86
If the WHO considers an illness to be a public health emergency of interna-
tional concern, it provides recommendations concerning appropriate public 
health measures for application by the State affected by such an emergency, 
as well as by other States.
87
These recommendations are temporary.
88
After 
considering coronavirus to be a public health emergency of international 
concern, the WHO Emergency Committee adopted Temporary Recommen-
dations under the International Health Regulations in January 2020.
89
WHO recommendations may provide a benchmark for assessing wheth-
er measures are reasonable, because they are emanated by an international 
organization with wide membership. Nonetheless, states can still adopt 
more “ambitious measures adapted to national risks and capacities.”
90
It is
lawful for states to go beyond or adopt additional measures under the
IHR. Although the IHR are legally binding, their main objective is to sup-
port governments in coping with, and promptly reporting, emerging interna-
tional health risks.
91
As a broad framework for action, the IHR leaves open 
various questions of detail.
As such, several states have gone beyond the WHO Emergency Com-
mittee’s Temporary Recommendations made under the International Health 
Regulations in January 2020. For instance, the recommendations “[did] not 
recommend any travel or trade restriction based on the current information 
available.”
92
Nonetheless, “more than 80 governments have placed re-
strictions of some sort on the export of personal protective equipment and 
medication necessary to treat those affected by the virus.”
93
In addition, 
some states have made the use of health masks compulsory in public despite 
the WHO’s initial stance on the matter that only ill people and people assist-
86. Id.
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tions (2005), WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/ihr/procedures/pheic/en/ (last visit-
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ing them should wear face masks.
94
 Nowadays, the WHO encourages the 
use of face masks more generally.
95
 More stringent measures may be neces-
sary, as scientists and policy makers are learning while they are trying to 
bring the pandemic under control. As the Director of the London School of 
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, Peter Piot, pointed out, “the more we learn 
about the virus, the more questions arise.”
96
 
Local conditions matter in assessing whether given state measures 
comply with the fair and equitable treatment standard. For example, the Ar-
bitral Tribunal in Mamidoil v. Albania held that the FET must be calibrated 
according to the circumstances of the host state by considering “the heritage 
of the past as well as the overwhelming necessities of the present and fu-
ture.”
97
 Similarly, in Philip Morris International (PMI) v. Uruguay, the ma-
jority similarly held that  the FET standard “d[oes] not preclude govern-
ments from enacting novel rules, even if these are in advance of 
international practice, provided these have some rational basis and are not 
discriminatory.”
98
 Therefore, as the pandemic is spreading across the globe, 
it would be irrational to insist that states maintain the stability of their legal 
framework. 
Accordingly, can a state’s failure to take early or suitable measures to 
contain the spread of the virus violate the fair and equitable treatment stand-
ard “if such failure necessitated . . . drastic state measures at a later time pe-
riod that harmed investments significantly”?
99
 If a host state had adopted a 
modest virus response strategy which made its whole situation worse and 
this then impacted the investor negatively, could the investor argue that this 
is in breach of the FET standard, given that the host state failed to develop 
an effective virus response strategy?  Assuming the investor suffers harm, 
could the state be held liable to the investor in some way for not having 
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made better choices, especially if these were not in compliance with interna-
tional standards as set by relevant international health bodies? 
Foreign investors could, in theory, argue that state’s non-compliance 
with the IHR contributed to the worsening of the pandemic and increased 
economic damage. However, due to the novelty of the coronavirus and the 
limited information available to governments in the early development of 
the pandemic, governments’ actions varied widely across the globe.
100
 
Without full knowledge of the virus’ features, symptoms, and modes of 
transmission—data that is continually being changed and refined—states’ 
reactions were uneven and depended on different criteria, such as the diffu-
sion of the virus, growing knowledge about the disease, emergency prepar-
edness, and different cultural levels of risk aversion. The IHR does not in-
clude an enforcement mechanism for states which fail to comply with its 
provisions.
101
 Instead, it relies on “peer pressure” and blame and shame 
mechanisms to induce state compliance.
102
 If conflicts arise between states 
concerning the interpretation or application of the regulations, states can opt 
for negotiation, mediation, and conciliation.
103
 They can also settle their dis-
putes by referring them to the Director-General of the WHO or by arbitra-
tion.
104
 Although the dispute settlement provisions of the IHR have not been 
invoked yet, there is a possibility that a commission of inquiry might be es-
tablished.
105
 However, as we have seen, the adoption of a modest response 
to the crisis should not be considered as faulty especially if the response was 
calibrated to the IHR and conformed with relevant international recommen-
dations. If a state systematically ignored recommendations of the WHO 
and/or other public health experts, deliberately discriminating against and 
disrupting the business of given foreign investors, this could perhaps 
amount to a breach of the fair and equitable treatment standard. 
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And even if one could consider a modest response to the crisis as faulty,
past claims attempting to employ investment treaty provisions, such as FET,
as a tool to enforce environmental obligations or indigenous peoples’ rights
have not been successful.
106
From a legal perspective, the Allard tribunal
held that investment treaties are not intended to enforce non-investment-
related matters and that they cannot bypass the will of states by expanding
their jurisdiction over matters not governed by the applicable treaty.
107
Only
“acts showing a willful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of action falling far 
below international standards, or even subjective bad faith” could give rise 
to state liability.
108
Therefore, it is doubtful that investors could successfully
claim that state’s non-compliance with the IHR amounts to a breach of the
fair and equitable treatment standard unless there was deliberate intent to
affect foreign investors and their business.
B. Non-Discrimination
Investment treaties generally prohibit discrimination against foreign in-
vestors and their investments and include provisions on national treatment
and most-favored-nation treatment.
109
The national treatment standard re-
quires the host state not to provide less favorable treatment, either de facto
or de jure, to foreign investors compared to domestic investors in similar
situations.
110
Meanwhile, the most favored nation treatment prohibits the
host state from providing less favorable treatment to foreign investors com-
pared to other investors of a different nationality.
111
Investors may claim that the given measures were designed or imple-
mented in such a way that discriminates against them. If emergency
measures seek to bolster national productivity and support domestic indus-
tries, investors may contend that such actions constitute a breach of the na-
tional treatment standard. In addition, border closures may affect foreign
businesses more than similar domestic enterprises, resulting in indirect dis-
crimination.
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Nonetheless, some regulatory distinctions may be upheld if they pursue
legitimate public interests, are taken in good faith, and are reasonably tai-
lored to achieve such interests.
112
Closing borders and restricting freedom of
movement, for example, may be justified by the need to prevent the spread
of disease at home and overseas, and may be objectively grounded in the
need to save lives. As a highly reputed scholar pointed out, “Article 43 of 
the IHR clearly leaves room for action going beyond that recommended by 
the WHO, consistent with respect for States’ sovereign rights (IHR art. 3.4), 
in appropriate circumstances.”
113
Protecting public health is a legitimate ob-
jective that can empower states to restrict economic freedoms in line with
most constitutions and international instruments.
114
Moreover, indirect dis-
crimination is difficult to prove, especially when measures have regulated
entire economic sectors.
115
There may, however, be cases in which state authorities have adopted
specific measures targeting the operations of certain companies under the
pretext of the ongoing crisis. If public health were used simply as a pretext
for other motives, as would hypothetically be the case if a state permanently
nationalized airlines, utilities companies, or natural resources industries un-
related to the crisis,
116
then investor-state arbitration could be a tool to en-
sure access to justice to affected investors. In other words, “not only the ef-
fects of the measures, but also the aims would be relevant in order to find
discrimination.”
117
In certain cases, the existence of good faith and legiti-
mate regulatory purposes “would dispense with the necessity to invoke ex-
ceptions.”
118
In conclusion, arbitral tribunals must necessarily adopt a case-
by-case approach.
119
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tion, arbitral tribunals should “weigh and balance” “a range of factors”).
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C. Expropriation
Expropriation constitutes a central notion in every international invest-
ment treaty, but it lacks a uniform definition.
120
The Oxford English Dic-
tionary defines expropriation as a taking of property from its owner for pub-
lic use or benefit. It comes from medieval Latin ‘expropriare’ meaning to 
take from the owner (ex = from and proprium = one’s own).121 The right to 
expropriate inheres in every state.
122
It is recognized under national and in-
ternational law.
123
Expropriation rules govern the clash between private 
property and the state authority to take measures for the commonweal.
The concept of expropriation is broadly construed in investment treaties 
to not only protect foreign assets from the direct and full taking of property, 
but also from de facto or indirect expropriation.
124
Direct expropriation im-
plies the transfer of the legal title from the owner to the state.
125
It consti-
tutes a deprivation of foreign investors’ ownership and appropriation of 
those rights by the state.
126
Indirect expropriation, on the other hand, indi-
cates a government measure that, while not on its face expropriatory, results 
in the deprivation of foreign investors’ property. Treaty provisions generally 
lack a precise definition of indirect expropriation, and their language en-
compasses a wide variety of state activities that may interfere with investor 
property. Indirect expropriations also interfere in the use of property even 
where the property is not seized, and the legal title of the property is not af-
fected. For instance, the host state may target a foreign investor by imposing 
very high taxes or regulatory requirements that make the foreign investment 
economically unviable.
127
Other examples of indirect expropriation include 
the repudiation of concession agreements, denial of permits necessary to 
operate a concession, and the freezing of investor’s accounts.
128
Substantial 
deprivation of an asset is the international law threshold for the existence of 
120. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Expropriation: A Sequel, U.N. Doc. UCTAD/DIAE
/IA/2011/7 (Vol. II), xi (2012). 
121. Emmis Int’l Holding v. Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/12/2, Award, ¶ 159 (Apr. 16, 
2014), https://www.italaw.com/cases/384.
122. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 120, at 1 (noting that “States have a sover-
eign right under international law to take property held by nationals or aliens through nation-
alization or expropriation for economic, political, social or other reasons.”).
123. See id.
124. Id. at xi.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Rep. of Costa Ri-
ca, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award, (Feb. 17, 2000), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default
/files/case-documents/italaw6340.pdf.
127. See generally Ali Lazem & Ilias Bantekas, The Treatment of Tax as Expropriation 
in International Investor–State Arbitration, ARB. INT’L, 2015, at 1.
128. See, e.g., Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russ. Fed’n, PCA Case No. #2005-
04/AA227, Final Award, ¶ 63 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2014), https://pcacases.com/web/sendAttach
/420.




 Only state activity that wholly or substantially de-
prives investors of the enjoyment of their rights amounts to expropriation.
130
 
Direct expropriations are lawful if a state pursues a public interest, fol-
lows due process, and provides adequate compensation in a non-
discriminatory manner.
131
 Ascertaining whether a direct expropriation is 
lawful is relatively straightforward. For instance, Swiss legislation enabling 
the Federal Council to order both the mandatory production and the confis-
cation of public health-related goods while providing a cost-covering com-
pensation, was considered a lawful expropriation.
132
 It certainly pursued a 
public interest, and it followed due process as it was adopted by an act of 
Parliament. It provided compensation and was non-discriminatory. None-
theless, while direct and overt expropriations are now rare, indirect expro-




With regard to indirect expropriation, the distinction between simple 
regulatory measures and those that amount to indirect expropriation is cru-
cial.
134
 However, the boundaries are blurred.
135
 For instance, a debate has 
arisen as to whether compulsory licenses constitute indirect expropriation. 
As is known, under a compulsory license, a company seeking to use anoth-
er’s intellectual property can do so without the right holder’s consent, albeit 
paying them a determined fee for such use.
136
 As I  argued elsewhere, non-
voluntary licenses do not amount to  expropriation, as they provide compen-
sation and are a specific intellectual property tool that states have used for 
centuries to address health emergencies.
137
 In this regard, Israel’s issuance of 
a non-voluntary license allowing the importation of an antiviral treatment 
 
 129. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 120, at 64 (noting that “In the majority of 
cases to date, claims of indirect expropriation have been dismissed because the negative im-
pact of the measure did not rise to the level of a taking.”) 
 130. See ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF 
INVESTMENT TREATIES 357 (2009) (noting that “[A]lthough regulatory measures designed to 
protect the environment, health and safety or ensure fair competition frequently impose regu-
latory and compliance costs on an investment, these will not normally reach the threshold of a 
substantial deprivation”). 
 131. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 120, at 12. 
 132. Recueil officiel du droit federal [RO] [Official Compilation of Federal Law] Mar. 
13, 2020, RS 818.101.24 (Switz.). 
 133. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 120, at 1–2. 
 134. Id. at 12–13 (“In some instances, an act or measure of the State taken in the exer-
cise of the State’s police powers or its right to regulate in the public interest can lead to a sig-
nificant impairment of businesses. The question then arises how to distinguish between an 
expropriatory measure and a normal (and thus non-compensable) regulatory act of State.”). 
 135. See id. at 13–14. 
 136. Valentina Vadi, Towards a New Dialectics—Pharmaceutical Patents, Public 
Health and Foreign Direct Investments, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L.113, 157 (2015). 
 137. See VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
AND ARBITRATION 76–80 (2012). 
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protected by patents, for example, should not be seen as an unlawful indirect 
expropriation, but as a legitimate exercise of state sovereignty to make full 




Other claims may arise if states deny the patentability of formulae in re-
lation to the new medical use of existing medicines. For example, medicines 
used for the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis have been repurposed to treat 
COVID-19.
139
 Similarly, scientists “found that steroids were linked with a 
one-third reduction in deaths among critically ill Covid-19 patients.”
140
 
While “claims on the second medical use of medicines are allowed in many 
countries that interpret patentability criteria expansively,”
141
 such evergreen-
ing of patents—that is, obtaining new patents for the same formula because 
of its new medical uses, thus ultimately preventing competition and the 
lowering of the product price—is not required under international law.
142
 
Rather, arguments are made that evergreening claims “fail to comply with 
the requirements of novelty and industrial applicability,”
143
 thus being in 
breach of article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellec-
tual Property Rights (“TRIPS Agreement”).
144
 Accordingly, denying such 
evergreening of patents should not be viewed as an indirect expropriation, 
but as a legitimate exercise of states’ regulatory powers.
145
 
It is also of note that in the growing tide of arbitral jurisprudence, two 
streams have emerged concerning expropriation: the sole-effects doctrine 
and the police powers doctrine. While the former focuses on the effects of 
 
 138. See Ministry of Health Permit (Isrl.), A Permit to the State to Exploit an Invention 
Pursuant to Chapter Six, Article Three of the Patents Law 5727-1967 (Mar. 18, 2020), https:
//www.keionline.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Permit-to-the-State-to-Exploit-an-Invention-
Pursuant-to-Chapter-Six-Article-Three-of-the-Patents-Law-5727-1967.pdf. 
 139. Viviana Muñoz Tellez, The COVID-19 Pandemic: R&D and Intellectual Property 
Management for Access to Diagnostics, Medicines and Vaccines 4 (South Centre Policy Brief 
No. 73, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3640229. 
 140. Roni Caryn Rabin, Steroids Can Be Lifesaving for Covid-19 Patients, Scientists 
Report, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/health/coronavirus-
steroids.html. 
 141. Muñoz Tellez, supra note 139, at 4. 
 142. See generally Michelangelo Temmerman, The Legal Notion of Abuse of Patent 
Rights (Swiss Nat’l Ctr. Competence Rsch. Working Paper No. 2011/23, 2011) (considering 
whether evergreening can be considered to be an abuse of patent rights). 
 143. Muñoz Tellez, supra note 139, at 4. 
 144. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 27, Apr. 
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. (“Subject to 
the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents shall be available for any inventions, whether 
products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an in-
ventive step and are capable of industrial application.”) 
 145. See generally Vadi, supra note 136, at 156–65; Valentina Vadi, Investment Dis-
putes, Pharmaceutical Patents and Health-Related Goods, in THE NEW INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY OF HEALTH — BEYOND PLAIN PACKAGING (Alberto Alemanno & Enrico Bonadio 
eds., 2016). 
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the state measure on foreign property, and thus, favors the investor’s per-
spective, the latter focuses on the alleged goal of the state measure. Accord-
ing to the sole effects doctrine, which focuses on the negative impact of 
regulation on foreign investment, compensation must be paid whenever the 
foreign investment is economically affected by a regulation.
146
 The objective 
of the government is irrelevant; the intent to expropriate is not a necessary 
element of state responsibility.
147
 According to the police powers doctrine, 
however, general regulation adopted bona fide and in a non-discriminatory 
manner to protect public health cannot be compensated.
148
 Both doctrines 
have generated significant jurisprudence. 
Several characteristics can indicate that a measure at stake constitutes 
an indirect expropriation. If a state adopts a general regulation that de facto 
targets a foreign investor or only applies to foreign investments, such dis-
crimination may constitute evidence that there is indirect expropriation that 
can be compensated. Furthermore, a significant interference or economic 




If, however, the general regulation targeting the protection of public 
health affects both citizens and foreign companies, has a legitimate objec-
tive, and does not involve the acquisition or transfer of property from the 
investor to the state, then it may be deemed a legitimate exercise of the po-
lice powers of the state.
150
 Barnali Choudhury considers the police powers 
doctrine to be a justification of state conduct that would otherwise lead to 
compensation.
151
 Other scholars, such as Santiago Montt, Valentina Vadi, 
Howard Mann, and Konrad Von Moltke regard it to be a legitimate exercise 




 146. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, 
Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 20, 2000), 40 I.L.M. 36 (“expropriation under NAFTA includes not only 
open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of property, such as outright seizure or formal or 
obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host State, but also covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant 
part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of property even if not neces-
sarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.”). 
 147. Id. ¶ 111. 
 148. Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to 
Regulate” in International Investment Law 18–19 (Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. 
Working Papers on International Investment 2004/02, 2004). 
 149. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., supra note 120, at 64. 
 150. VADI, supra note 137, at 139. 
 151. Barnali Choudhuri, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s En-
gagement of the Public Interest Contributing to Democratic Deficit?, 41 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 794 (2008) (considering the police powers doctrine as an exception). 
 152. VADI, supra note 137, at 140; SANTIAGO MONTT, STATE LIABILITY IN 
INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION 192–93 (2012); HOWARD MANN & KONRAD VON 
MOLTKE, PROTECTING INVESTOR RIGHTS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: ASSESSING NAFTA’S 
CHAPTER 11 at 15 (2003). 
344 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 42:321 
 
Given this, investors may argue that business closures, curfews, and the 
creation of sanitary cordons—isolated geographic zones with bars on entry 
and exit—amount to an indirect expropriation of their business. Such 
measures may have had a particularly negative impact on economic sectors 
that depend on free movement. As noted above, companies may alternative-
ly contend that compulsory licenses—permission to use proprietary tech-
nology to treat patients or develop vaccines or therapies—amount to indirect 
expropriation.
153
 They may also argue that state orders confiscating personal 
protective equipment or requiring companies to produce goods, such as 
masks, gloves, gowns, and ventilators, amounts to expropriation. Mean-
while, many foreign investors have likely been impacted by state re-
strictions on the export of pharmaceutical ingredients. Some states have 
even empowered the government to temporarily take control of industries, 
factories, and private hospitals in order to ensure the supply of goods and 
services necessary for the protection of public health.
154
 An investor could 
claim that such temporary control over its factory constitutes an indirect ex-
propriation if the requisition lasts for a sufficiently long period of time 
without adequate compensation, or if the state does not return control after 
the end of the pandemic.
155
 
IV.  POTENTIAL STATE RESPONSES 
This part investigates the argumentative patterns that states may use in 
investor-state arbitrations related to a pandemic situation. States may raise 
several legal arguments and defenses in investor-state arbitrations arising in 
the aftermath of the coronavirus crisis. Arbitral tribunals have previously 
addressed a range of public health-related disputes, including those related 




 153. VADI, supra note 137, at 76. 
 154. Hailes, supra note 90, at 1.  
 155. Middle E. Cement Shipping & Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 107 (Apr. 12, 2002), 7 ICSID Rep. 173 (2005) (finding 
the suspension of an export license for four months amounted to indirect expropriation and 
that, more generally “[w]hen measures are taken by a State the effect of which is to deprive 
the investor of the use and benefit of his investment even though he may retain nominal own-
ership of the respective rights being the investment, the measures are often referred to as a 
‘creeping’ or ‘indirect’ expropriation or . . . as measures the effect of which is tantamount to 
expropriation.”); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 
Award,¶ 97 (Dec. 8, 2000), 6 ISCID Rep. 67 (2004) (holding that investor’s loss of control of 
property for one year amounted to indirect expropriation as “it is generally accepted in inter-
national law, that a case of expropriation exists not only when a state takes over private prop-
erty, but also when the expropriating state transfers ownership to another legal or natural per-
son.”). 
 156. See generally VADI, supra note 137; Valentina Vadi, The Environmental Health 
Spillovers of Foreign Direct Investment in International Investment Arbitration, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL AND EU LAW: CURRENT CHALLENGES AND 
LEGAL RESPONSES 43 (Stefania Negri ed., 2019); Valentina Vadi, Energy Security v. Public 
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Nonetheless, the current pandemic “is qualitatively different” because of its 
“pervasive and simultaneous impacts on human rights, economic interests, 
and national security.”
157
 Arbitral tribunals have been traditionally reluctant 
to weigh human rights and security considerations in the adjudication of in-
vestment disputes, focusing instead on the economic dimension of such dis-
putes.
158
 The coronavirus pandemic now challenges this traditional interpre-
tive stance, as it requires the full use of the legal mechanisms that 
international law offers. 
A.  Police Powers 
The protection of public health is not only a fundamental state interest 
but also a fundamental duty derived from both human rights law and the so-
cial compact between a state and its citizens.
159
 The population of a country 
constitutes a component part of the state, together with territory and gov-
ernment, and also its raison d’être.160 The protection of its population is 
thereby a paramount interest.
161
 Following this reasoning, public health 
measures adopted to fight the coronavirus pandemic fall under state police 
powers—the plenary authority to provide for the well-being of state citi-
zens. Thus, the measures adopted to fight the coronavirus may not constitute 
expropriation in the first place.
162
 
Pandemics have variously shaped laws for centuries.
163
 From the beginnings 
of human civilization, public authorities have often taken measures to prevent the 
 
Health? Nuclear Energy in International Investment Law and Arbitration, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 
1069 (2016); Valentina Vadi, Global Health Governance at a Crossroads: Trademark Protec-
tion v. Tobacco Control in International Investment Law, 48 STAN. J. INT’L L. 93 (2012). 
 157. Nicholas J. Diamond, Pandemics, Emergency Measures, and ISDS, KLUWER ARB. 
BLOG (Apr. 13, 2020), http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2020/04/13/pandemics-
emergency-measures-and-isds.  
 158. See, e.g., infra Section IV.B (discussing the cases concerning Argentina’s financial 
crisis). 
 159. VADI, supra note 137, at 28. 
 160. Id. at 30. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See also supra Section III.C. 
 163. See generally, e.g., Mitra Sharafi, Pandemic or Poison? How Epidemics Shaped 
South Asia’s Legal History, HIMAL S. ASIAN (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.himalmag.com
/pandemic-or-poison-2020/; CARLO M. CIPOLLA, FAITH, REASON, AND THE PLAGUE (Muriel 
Kittle trans., 1981) (detailing the outbreak of plague in seventeenth-century Tuscany, and the 
subsequent lockdowns and quarantines); CARLO M. CIPOLLA, PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE 
MEDICAL PROFESSION IN THE RENAISSANCE (1973); JOHN HENDERSON, FLORENCE UNDER 
SIEGE: SURVIVING PLAGUE IN AN EARLY MODERN CITY (2019) (examining how seventeenth-
century Florence confronted, suffered, and survived a major epidemic of plague and showing 
how the public health governance methods developed by the Italian city-states spread across 
the world); SUSAN MOSHER STUARD, A STATE OF DEFERENCE, RAGUSA/DUBROVNIK IN THE 
MEDIEVAL CENTURIES (2016) (detailing how the Ragusan council introduced a thirty-two-
day forced isolation period and later forbade the import of wheat, fruit and cloth from loca-
tions known to harbor the plague).  




 Quarantine, which is compulsory isolation to contain the 
spread of disease, represents one of the most ancient regulations concerning pub-
lic health.
165
 The 643 Edict of Rothari (606-652), devoted a chapter to the treat-
ment of lepers and provided for the Separatio Leprosorum, a practice which 




During the fourteenth century Black Death in Europe, as a measure of dis-
ease prevention related to the plague, ships and people had to spend forty days in 
isolation prior to entering Venetian ports.
167
 Vessels were also ordered to be 
burned with their cargo if infection was suspected.
168
 Modern public health 
measures were later systematically adopted in the mid-nineteenth century in sev-
eral countries as part of both social reform movements and the growth of biolog-
ical and medical knowledge.
169
 Major European states concluded that the interna-
tional spread of infectious diseases could no longer be handled as a matter only 
of national governance; the nature of the problem—diseases spreading across 
borders through international trade and travel—demanded international coopera-
tion.
170
 Therefore, several international conferences were held to unite action in 
preventing the spread of cholera and other diseases.
171
 In the United States, gen-
eral quarantine measures were adopted during the Spanish flu pandemic a centu-
ry ago.
172
 More recently, specific quarantine measures were adopted with regard 
to travelers coming from pandemic-affected countries.
173
 African and Asian 
states have similarly adopted measures to fight the spread of Ebola, Zika, and 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome.
174
 States have adopted a range of 
measures to fight pandemics for centuries.
175
 Thus, for centuries, pandemics 
have tested the boundaries between the protection of individual freedoms and 
the safeguarding of the common good. 
 
 164. VADI, supra note 137, at 26–27. 
 165. Id. at 26. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 26–27. 
 170. Id. at 26. 
 171. Id. at 27. 
 172. See Howard Markel, Harvey B. Lipman, J. Alexander Navarro, Alexandra Sloan, 
Joseph R. Michalsen, Alexandra Minna Stern & Martin S. Cetron, Nonpharmaceutical Inter-
ventions Implemented by US Cities During the 1918-1919 Influenza Pandemic, 6 J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N 644, 644–45 (2007). 
 173. MICAELA DEL MONTE, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH SERVICE, US 
FEDERAL AND STATE TRAVEL LIMITS AND QUARANTINE MEASURES (2020). 
 174. Dep’t Glob. Commc’ns, Learning from the Past: UN Draws Lessons from Ebola, 
Other Crises to Fight COVID-19, UNITED NATIONS (May 13, 2020), https://www.un.org/en
/coronavirus/learning-past-un-draws-lessons-ebola-other-crises-fight-covid-19.  
 175. See VADI, supra note 137, at 26–27. 
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Many public health measures reflect the legitimate exercise of regulato-
ry powers for public welfare and express “the classic function of govern-
ment to limit the transmission of infectious diseases.”
176
As noted by a pub-
lic health expert, public health measures can be broad and invasive, but rest
on a solid legal basis “that recognizes the unique capacity of govern-
ment . . . to play a coordinating role in times when individual actions pose
society-wide risks” and collective action is needed.
177
In other words,
“where there is a visceral threat to society as a whole, governments have
wide latitude to protect the population.”
178
States have broad regulatory autonomy, including the “police powers”
to adopt measures to protect public health under customary international
law.
179
The term “police” may seem misleading to contemporary readers and 
the overall expression “police powers” lacks a clear definition. In his 1793 
Lectures on Justice, Police, Revenues, and Arms, Adam Smith noted that 
“police” derives from the Greek politeia (polity).180 Police powers indicate 
the exercise of state policy or the adoption of regulation that aims at pre-
venting nuisance and protecting public health that may encroach on individ-
ual economic interests.
181
Police powers indicate the power of the state to 
restrain property rights of persons for the protection of essential public in-
terests such as public order, public health and security, and preventing 
harm/nuisance.
182
Not only domestic law, but also international law has tra-
ditionally attached “normative priority to sovereign regulation in an epidem-
ic,”
183
as such measures “have been a core expression of police power.”
184
The police powers doctrine exempts from liability only reasonable,
good faith, and non-discriminatory exercise of such powers.
185
However, the
legal status of the police powers doctrine has long been uncertain.
186
Some
argue that it belongs to customary international law or that it constitutes a
general principle of international law.
187
It certainly constitutes more than a
mere interpretive tool, as shown by jurisprudential developments.
188
176. Kristen Underhill, Public Health Law Tools: A Brief Guide, in LAW IN THE TIME 
OF COVID-19 59, 59 (Katharina Pistor ed., 2020) (“for any given individual, the costs of pro-
tective measures . . . may be greater than the risks posed by continuing ordinary life. But for
the population as a whole, continuing life as usual will result in a large number of deaths.”).
177. Id. at 60.
178. Id.
179. Diamond, supra note 157.
180. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMS 154 (1763).
181. VADI, supra note 137, at 139–40.
182. Id.
183. Hailes, supra note 90, at 4.
184. Id.
185. See, e.g., VADI, supra note 137, at141.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Saluka Inv. B.V. v. Czech, Partial Award, ¶ 262 (Perm Ct. Arb., 2006), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf (“in the opinion of the 
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As early as 1903, the umpire in the Bischoff case, in dismissing a claim 
for damages, held that “[c]ertainly during an epidemic of an infectious dis-
ease there can be no liability for the reasonable exercise of police pow-
ers.”
189
In this case, the police had taken a carriage belonging to the claimant 
in Caracas, Venezuela in August 1898 during an epidemic of smallpox. The 
police received information that the carriage had carried two persons afflict-
ed with the disease, and the police kept it in custody for a considerable time. 
The umpire concluded that the police measure had been lawful, and that the 
damage to the owner’s business was “not legally recoverable.”
190
More recently, in PMI v. Uruguay, the Arbitral Tribunal recognized that
“[p]rotecting public health has long been recognized as an essential mani-
festation of the State’s police power” and thus held that tobacco control
measures did constitute an expropriation.
191
Even more importantly, the Tri-
bunal acknowledged that police power is an “accepted principle of custom-
ary international law.”
192
The Tribunal in Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech
Republic similarly held that: “[T]he principle that a State . . .adopts general 
regulations that are ‘commonly accepted as within the police power of 
States’ forms part of customary international law today.”
193
Arbitral tribunals can apply customary international law if the applica-
ble law is international law. They can also interpret the expropriation provi-
sion of the applicable treaty in accordance with article 31(3)(c) of the Vien-
na Convention on the Law of Treaties.
194
This article requires that treaty 
provisions be interpreted in the light of “[a]ny relevant rules of international 
law applicable to the relations between the parties,” a reference “which in-
cludes . . . customary international law.”
195
Some states have explicitly in-
Tribunal, the principle that a state does not commit an expropriation and is thus not liable to 
pay compensation to a dispossessed foreign investor when it adopts general regulations that 
are commonly accepted within the police powers of the states forms part of customary interna-
tional law today.”); Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., Award, 30–31 (Ad Hoc NAFTA Arb., 
2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0149_0.pdf.
188. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10
/7, Award, ¶ 291 (July 8, 2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7417.pdf.
189. Bischoff Case, 10 R.I.A.A. 420, 420–21 (1903).
190. Id. at 420.
191. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10
/7, Award, ¶ 291 (2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7417.pdf.
192. Id. ¶ 294.
193. Saluka Inv. B.V. v. Czech, Partial Award, ¶ 262 (Perm. Ct. Arb., 2006), https:
//www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf. 
194. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(3)(c), May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT].
195. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10
/7, Award, ¶ 291 (2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7417.pdf.
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cluded reference to their police powers in their treaties and arbitral tribunals
have increasingly tended to apply it.
196
According to the police powers principle, “where economic injury re-
sults from a bona fide non-discriminatory regulation within the police power 
of the state, compensation is not required.”
197
In PMI v. Uruguay, the Tribu-
nal concluded that the legitimate exercise of the state’s police powers does
not amount to an expropriation and does not require compensation.
198
The 
Saluka Tribunal also held that states are not liable to pay compensation to a 
foreign investor when, in the normal exercise of their police powers, they 
adopt in a non-discriminatory manner bona fide regulations that are aimed 
at the general welfare.
199
Furthermore, the Tribunal in Methanex  Corp. v. 
U.S. similarly stated that: “[A]s a matter of general international law, a non-
discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accord-
ance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or 
investment is not deemed expropriatory.”
200
Finally, the Tribunal in Telenor 
Mobile  Communications A.S. v. Hungary confirmed this line of reasoning 
by stating that “it is well established that the mere exercise by government 
of regulatory powers that create impediments to business or entail the pay-
ment of taxes or other levies does not of itself constitute expropriation.”
201
The response to the coronavirus pandemic has logically differed across
the globe because the pandemic has affected states in different ways and at
different times. Moreover, national responses to epidemics are “inherently 
political.”
202
“The experts selected for consultation, the evidence used to in-
form response pathways, and narratives . . . are politically driven,”
203
and 
public health choices often reflect the fundamental cultural choices and val-
196. See, e.g., Investment Agreement for the Common Investment Area art. 20.8, May 
23, 2007, https://www.iisd.org/toolkits/sustainability-toolkit-for-trade-negotiators/wp-content
/uploads/2016/06/rei120.06tt1.pdf (“Consistent with the right of states to regulate and the cus-
tomary international law principles on police powers, bona fide regulatory measures taken by 
a Member State that are designed and applied to protect or enhance legitimate public welfare 
objectives, such as public health, safety and the environment, shall not constitute an indirect 
expropriation under this Article.”).
197. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl. v. Oriental Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10
/7, Award, ¶ 294 (2016), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/italaw7417.pdf.
198. Id. ¶ 307.
199. Saluka Inv. B.V. v. Czech, Partial Award, ¶ 262 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0740.pdf.
200. See Methanex Corp. v. U.S., UNCITRAL, Award, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 7 (Aug. 3, 2005), 
https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0529.pdf.
201. Telenor Mobile Commc’ns A.S. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/04
/15, Award, ¶  64 (Sept. 13, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents
/ita0858.pdf.
202. See Lydia Kapiriri & Alison Ross, The Politics of Disease Epidemics: A Compara-
tive Analysis of the SARS, Zika, and Ebola Outbreaks, 7 GLOB. SOC. WELFARE 33, 33 (2018).
203. Id.
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ues of given countries.
204
Public health policies are also cultural choices as 
they are based on “shared conventional beliefs, practices and values.”
205
For 
this reason, they dramatically vary in the duration and generality of
measures, enforcement penalties, and application to individuals and/or
communities. Although public health measures, such as quarantines and
lockdowns, can interfere with many rights, including economic freedoms,
domestic courts “usually find that states’ interest in public health outweighs
these freedoms . . . as long as they are reasonable in relation to the threat to
public health.”
206
International courts and tribunals have upheld state actions that are rea-
sonable, adopted in good faith, and non-discriminatory.
207
Where there is a
serious public health threat, courts and arbitral tribunals should not second
guess public health measures adopted in response to global pandemics. In-
stead, they should check the reasonableness of the adopted measures, con-
sidering that “the state’s interest in public health tends to outweigh individ-
ual freedoms.”
208
That the coronavirus is a severe public health threat is
uncontroversial. Accordingly, international courts and tribunals need only
verify that state measures are not merely a pretext for discriminating against
foreign investors. For state measures to stand arbitral scrutiny, authorities
must adopt reasonable actions, and procedural due process is needed.
B. Treaty Exceptions
International investment law includes a number of treaty-based safety 
valves that exempt the parties from their respective obligations in specific 
situations. These flexibilities not only align with the basic pillars of interna-
tional law but also strengthen the stability of the respective treaty systems. 
Considerations of justice, the perceived legitimacy and long-term viability 
of the treaty, and the maintenance of peace and security also matter.
While in early investment treaties, exceptions were generally few and
far between, recent treaties increasingly reaffirm the state’s right to regulate
in the public interest by introducing general exceptions and/or clarifications
204. See generally A. DAVID NAPIER, MICHAEL DEPLEDGE, MICHAEL KNIPPER,
REBECCA LOVELL, EDOUARD PONARIN, EMILIA SANABRIA & FELICITY THOMAS, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION REGIONAL OFFICE FOR EUROPE, CULTURE MATTERS: USING A 
CULTURAL CONTEXTS OF HEALTH APPROACH TO ENHANCE POLICY-MAKING vii (2017), 
https://www.euro.who.int/__data/assets/pdf_file/0009/334269/14780_World-Health-
Organisation_Context-of-Health_TEXT-AW-WEB.pdf (highlighting that “shared convention-
al beliefs, practices and values can have profound impacts on health and well-being”).
205. Id.
206. Underhill, supra note 176, at 64.
207. See, e.g., Chemtura Corp. v. Gov’t of Can., Award, 30–31 (Ad Hoc NAFTA Arb., 
2010), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0149_0.pdf.2.
208. Underhill, supra note 176, at 64.
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as to the meaning of standards of protection.
209
 Exceptions to the standards 
of protections enable states to adopt measures otherwise prohibited by the 
international investment agreement to pursue specific policy objectives.
210
 
Clarifications, on the other hand, detail the content of vague investment 
treaty provisions such as the prohibition of unlawful expropriation. For in-
stance, the Canada–E.U. Free Trade Agreement includes provisions clarify-
ing that regulatory measures adopted to protect public health do not consti-
tute a breach of investment provisions.
211
 Other treaties governing foreign 
direct investment include a comprehensive general exception clause ena-
bling the parties to adopt measures to protect human life and public health 
provided that they are not arbitrary or discriminatory.
212
 Such general excep-
tion clause is often modeled after the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (“GATT”). As is known, the GATT includes a general exceptions’ 
provision, article XX, which enables states to adopt measures that are “nec-
essary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” provided that such 
measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of ar-
bitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade.” Finally, 
some treaties exempt measures pursuing legitimate public health objectives 
from arbitration claims.
213
 Such exceptions can make international invest-
ment treaties more flexible. However, as Newcombe cautioned, “the ap-
 
 209. Andrew Newcombe, General Exceptions in International Investment Agreements 2 
(BIICL Eighth Ann. WTO Conf., Draft Discussion Paper, 2008), https://www.biicl.org/files
/3866_andrew_newcombe.pdf (noting that “states, including the US, Canada and Norway, 
have developed new model IIAs that clarify the meaning and scope of investment obligations 
in much greater detail. While the typical BIT runs 8-10 pages, these new models run over 50 
pages.”). 
 210. U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Investment Policy Responses to the COVID-19 Pan-
demic, INV. POL’Y MONITOR (SPECIAL ISSUE), May 2020, at 14. 
 211. EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 8.9, E.U.-Can., 
Oct. 20, 2016 (stating that “the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their territories to 
achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, the envi-
ronment or public morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion and protection of 
cultural diversity. For greater certainty, the mere fact that a Party regulates, including through 
a modification to its laws, in a manner which negatively affects an investment or interferes 
with an investor’s expectations, including its expectations of profits, does not amount to a 
breach of an obligation under this Section.”). 
 212. Agreement Between Canada and the Republic of Peru for the Promotion and Pro-
tection of Investments, Can.-Peru, Nov. 14, 2006, https://investmentpolicy.unctad.org
/international-investment-agreements/treaty-files/626/download (“Subject to the requirement 
that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between investments or between investors, or a disguised restriction on inter-
national trade or investment, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent a Party 
from adopting or enforcing measures necessary: (a) to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health. . .”). 
 213. Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China art. 9.11.4, Austl.-China June 17, 2015, https:
//www.dfat.gov.au/sites/default/files/chafta-agreement-text.pdf [hereinafter ChAFTA]). 
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A small number of international investment treaties include a national 
security exception or “non-precluded measures” clauses.
215
 The term “non-
precluded measures” is due to the typical formulation of security excep-
tions. For instance, a paradigmatic example of such exception states: “the 
present treaty shall not preclude the application of measures. . . neces-
sary . . . for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and securi-
ty . . .” (emphasis added).
216
 The concept of national security is an evolving 
one,
217
 which can cover measures to protect a state’s essential security inter-
ests and to address serious threats to international peace and security, eco-
nomic crisis, terrorism, public health emergencies, or natural disasters.
218
 
While the content and shape of such clauses vary widely,
219
 they generally 
refer to security and public order.
220
 
The coronavirus crisis has consolidated an expansion of the notion of 
national security.
221
 In addressing the U.N. Security Council, the United 
Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, stated that “the COVID-19 
pandemic is profoundly affecting peace and security across the globe.”
222
 On 
July 1,2020, the U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 
 
 214. Newcombe, supra note 209, at 6. 
 215. See Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., art. 
XX(1), Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
art. XXI, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994];). ChAFTA, 
supra note 213, art. 16.3 (incorporating article XXI of GATT 1994 and article XIV bis of 
GATS into the Agreement, mutatis mutandis); United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement art. 
32.2(b), Nov. 3, 2018, Off. U.S. Trade Rep., Exec. Office of the President (providing a securi-
ty exception that applies to the whole treaty by stating, “nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to: . . . (b) preclude a Party from applying measures that it considers necessary for 
the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security, or the protection of its own essential security interests.”). 
 216. See The Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., art. 
XX(1), Aug. 15, 1955, 8 U.S.T. 899.  
 217. See generally Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Se-
curity: The Making of the GATT Security Exceptions, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 109 (2020). 
 218. Anne van Aaken, International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibil-
ity: The Making of the GATT Security Exceptions, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L 507, 523 (2020). 
 219. See, e.g., Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of In-
vestment, Arg.-U.S., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-2 (1993) (stating that 
measures that are necessary for the maintenance of public order or the protection of essential 
security interests are not precluded under the BIT) [hereinafter Arg.-U.S. BIT]. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Samantha Power, How the COVID-19 Era Will Change National Security Forever, 
TIME (Apr. 11, 2020, 5:37 PM), https://time.com/5820625/national-security-coronavirus-
samantha-power/ (noting that COVID 19 has spurred “a redefinition of national security”). 
 222. Press Release, Security Council, COVID-19 ‘Profoundly Affecting Peace across 
the Globe’, Says Secretary-General, in Address to Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC
/14241 (July 2, 2020). 




 Acknowledging that “the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 
pandemic is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security,” the Security Council “demand[ed] a general and immediate cessa-
tion of hostilities in all situations on its agenda.”
224
 This is not unprecedent-
ed: already in 2014 the U.N. Security Council considered Ebola a “threat to 
international peace and security.”
225
 More generally, as states’ vital interests 
are at stake, “the concept of national security expands to encompass issues 
such as . . . responses to pandemic disease.”
226
 
Questions still remain, however, as to who should judge the necessity of 
the adopted measures. Some clauses are explicitly self-judging, recognizing 
the parties’ authority to implement measures “which [they] conside[r] nec-
essary for the protection of [their]essential security interests.”
227
 For exam-
ple, article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement concerning compulsory licensing 
and the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health both 
enable states to define what constitutes a national emergency.
228
 Therefore, 
it is up to states to define their essential security interests independently of 
the eventual existence of an international consensus on the matter. While no 
country would be expected to protect foreign investments when doing so 
could jeopardize its security interests, and states hold primacy in defining 
their own security interests, they should not abuse the security exception to 
accomplish protectionist, industrial, or ulterior geopolitical motives.
229
 
Other clauses are not explicitly self-judging. Some scholars argue that if 
the state security exception were self-judging, then the exception would be 
unchecked and could be abused by states to enforce disguised protectionist 
regulations.
230
 They contend that arbitral tribunals should weigh and balance 
the protection of foreign investments and national security interests.
231
 Arbi-
tral tribunals’ approaches have oscillated between good faith scrutiny and 
full scrutiny in interpreting non-precluded measures clauses
232
 unless the 
 
 223. S.C. Res. 2532 (July 1, 2020). 
 224. Id. 
 225. S.C. Res. 2177 (Sept. 18, 2004). 
 226. J. Benton Heath, Trade and Security Among the Ruins, 30 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L 
L. 223, 223 (2020). 
 227. GATT 1994, supra note 215, art. XXI. 
 228. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 144, art. 31; Ministerial Declaration, On the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, ¶ 5, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (adopted 
Nov. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].  
 229. Compare with Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the Law GATT: An Analysis of 
GATT’s Security Exception,12 MICH. J. INT’L L.558, 578 (1991) (cautioning that abuses might 
happen). 
 230. Shin-yi Peng, Cybersecurity Threats and the WTO National Security Exceptions 18 
J. INT’L ECON. L. 449, 455 (2015). 
 231. Id. 
 232. Compare with William Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection 
in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Pro-
visions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 314 (2008) (noting that “tri-
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clause is explicitly self-judging. For example, article XI of the US-
Argentina BIT provides that the treaty “shall not preclude the application by 
either party of measures necessary for. . . the protection of its essential secu-
rity interests.”
233
By its terms, the clause is not explicitly self-judging be-
cause it refers to “measures necessary for” rather than “measures that the 
state considers necessary.”
234
Arbitral tribunals have thus reviewed whether 
certain measures were necessary for the protection of essential security in-
terests. In LG&E, the Tribunal held that the exception was not self-judging
and required substantive review. The Tribunal added that had the exception
been self-judging, it would nonetheless be subject to good faith review.
However, the tribunal held that the exception excused Argentina from any
obligation to pay compensation during the period of the emergency. Argen-
tina successfully relied on the exception to shield its economic emergency
measures from liability.
235
Parallel World Trade Organization jurisprudence indicates that interna-
tional tribunals have traditionally demonstrated a high level of deference 
towards state invocation of the national security exception.
236
The exception 
design in international investment treaties and GATT article XXI already 
enables a balance between Members’ security concerns and the economic 
interests of the international community in favor of the former.
237
Because 
national security matters are paramount concerns relating to the very exist-
ence of states, van Aaken argued that arbitral tribunals should not second-
guess the decisions of national policy-makers.
238
In conclusion, arbitral tribunals should adopt a balanced approach in in-
terpreting investment treaties by considering both the need to protect foreign 
investment and the state’s duty to protect public health.
239
If the relevant ex-
ception is self-judging, state measures should nonetheless be subject to a 
good faith review. If the exception is not self-judging, an objective assess-
ment will avoid second-guessing state decisions, while preventing abuse of 
bunals, however, took diametrically different approaches to the NPM clause of the U.S.-
Argentina BIT.”)
233. Arg.-U.S. BIT, supra note 219, art. XI.
234. See id.
235. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award (Sept. 5, 
2008), https://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf. 
236. See, e.g., Panel Report, Russia—Traffic in Transit, WTO Doc. WT/DS512/R 
(adopted Apr. 26, 2019).
237. Tania Voon, Can International Trade Law Recover? The Security Exception in 
WTO Law: Entering a New Era, 113 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 45, 49 (2019).
238. van Aaken, supra note 218, at 524. 
239. El Paso Energy Int’l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Deci-
sion of Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Apr. 27, 2006), https://www.italaw.com/cases/382 (calling for a 
“balanced interpretation”, “taking into account both state sovereignty and the State’s respon-
sibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic 
activities [on the one hand] and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing 
flow [on the other].”).
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the law, ensuring that good faith and reasonableness are maintained and pre-
serving the rule of law. Furthermore, a harmonious interpretation of interna-
tional legal obligations is required by article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, which calls for the consideration of other 
international treaties concluded between the parties when arbitral tribunals 
interpret given international instruments.
240
 
C.  Customary International Law Defenses 
State measures can also be justified under customary international law 
defenses such as force majeure, distress, and necessity.241 In a given case, 
the existence of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness does not terminate 
the obligation; rather, it “provides a justification or excuse for non-
performance while the circumstance in question subsists.”
242
 In other words, 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness “operate as a shield rather than a 
sword”
243
 “against an otherwise well-founded claim for the breach of an in-
ternational obligation.”
244
 The burden of proof to invoke these defenses rests 
on the party alleging excuse.
245
 
Customary international law defenses are generally studied together 
with the laws of state responsibility, that is, the principles governing when 
and how a state is held responsible for a breach of an internation-
al obligation.
246
 While the International Law Commission Articles on State 
Responsibility (“ILC Articles”)
247
 constitute an effort to codify such defens-
es, some of its provisions remain controversial.
248
 Composed by eminent 
scholars, the Articles can (and have) influence(d) arbitral and scholarly de-
velopments.
249
 Nonetheless, they cannot freeze the development of custom-
 
 240. VCLT, supra note 194, art. 31(3)(c). 
 241. See generally Helmut Philipp Aust, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness, in 
PRINCIPLES OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 169, 207 (André Nol-
lkaemper & Ilias Plakokefalos eds., 2014). 
 242. Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, with commentaries, of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc, A/56/10, at 71 
(2001). 
 243. Id.  
 244. Id. 
 245. Joost Pauwelyn, Defences and the Burden of Proof in International Law, in 
EXCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 88, 91–92 (Lorand Bartels & Federica Paddeu eds., 
2020). 
 246. See, e.g., MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 793–99 (6th ed. 2008). 
 247. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83, 
U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/49 (Vol. I)/Corr.4 (Dec. 12, 2001) 
[hereinafter ILC Articles]. 
 248. David D. Caron, The ILC Articles on State Responsibility: The Paradoxical Rela-
tionship between Form and Authority, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 857, 857 (2002). 
 249. Fernando Lusa Bordin, Reflections of Customary International Law: The Authority 
of Codification Conventions and ILC Draft Articles in International Law, 63 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 535, 535 (2014). 
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ary law that has evolved over the past decades. Moreover, concerns have 
arisen that—at least with regard to the circumstances precluding wrongful-
ness—the ILC Articles may endorse an excessively legalistic approach 
through endorsing a cumulative list of demanding requirements, the consid-
eration of which renders the invocation of any defense a fruitless exercise. 
1.  Force Majeure 
Force majeure (a superior force, vis major) generally refers to “an event 
that can be neither anticipated nor controlled.”
250
 It includes geopolitical 
events, such as war, sabotage, and terrorism, and natural disasters, such as 
hurricanes, tornados, floods, volcanic eruptions, and earthquakes that render 
a given obligation materially impossible to fulfill.
251
 Force majeure (vis ma-
jor) reflects the broader general principle of law that no one is expected to 
perform the impossible (ad impossibilia nemo tenetur) and that obligations 
must be possible to be legally binding.
252
 The precise effects of invoking a 
force majeure may depend on the duration of the event—“if it is of limited 
temporary effect, then performance is suspended.”
253
 As soon as the irresist-
ible force is no longer present, performance is expected.
254
 
There is, however, no uniform definition of force majeure. The ICC up-
dated its force majeure clause in March 2020 in response to the coronavirus 
crisis, defining it as “the occurrence of an event or circumstance that pre-
vents or impedes a party from performing one or more of its contractual ob-
ligations under the contract.”
255
 Under the ILC Articles, force majeure justi-
fies non–compliance if a given event occurred that was unforeseen or 
irresistible “beyond the control of the state,”
256
 and made it “materially im-
possible” to perform an obligation.
257
 The state must not have contributed to 
the situation and must not have assumed the risk of the situation occur-
ring.
258
 The fulfillment of the above requirements makes it difficult for states 
to invoke force majeure. 
 
 250. Force Majeure, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2006). 
 251. Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko & Eric Talley, COVID-19 as a Force Majeure 
in Corporate Transactions, in LAW IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 142 (Katharina Pistor ed., 
2020). 
 252. ILC Articles, supra note 247, art. 23. 
 253. Christian Twigg-Flesner, A Comparative Perspective on Commercial Contracts 
and the Impact of COVID19 - Change of Circumstances, Force Majeure, or What?, in LAW IN 
THE TIME OF COVID-19 155, 156 (Katharina Pistor ed., 2020). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. ILC Articles, supra note 247, art. 23.1. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. art. 23.2. 
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Force majeure has not played a leading role in recent arbitral jurispru-
dence, but this may change soon.
259
 Therefore, it is useful to examine some 
historical precedents briefly. Early cases suggest it is often difficult to 
demonstrate that it is impossible to make payments or fulfill obligations 
even in the context of a financial crisis. For instance, in the Russian Indem-
nity Case, the financial difficulties of the Ottoman Empire were insufficient-
ly grave to constitute force majeure and excuse the repayment of indemni-
ties due under the 1879 Treaty of Peace between Russia and Turkey to 
Russian subjects for losses incurred during the Turkish–Russian War of 
1877–78.
260
 Similarly, in the Serbian Loans case, Serbia claimed that force 
majeure exempted it from the repayment of debt to French bondholders be-
cause, after the war, it was impossible to pay the debt in gold francs. The 
Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that it was not impos-
sible for the government to pay in paper francs.
261
 
More interesting is the jurisprudence related to force majeure invoked 
during a humanitarian crisis or armed conflict. In such cases, foreign inves-
tors have invoked force majeure in order to relieve themselves from their 
obligations. As for the responsibility of states, customary international law 
provides that “a State cannot be held responsible either in case of popular 
insurrection, natural catastrophe, war situation or national state of emergen-
cy which often constitute force majeure situations.”
262
 In the Greco-
Bulgarian Communities Advisory Opinion, the PCIJ held that Greece should 
not oust Greek refugees that it had settled in housing owned but left empty 
by Bulgarians, and that it had to pay compensation to the Bulgarians.
263
 In 
French Company of Venezuelan Railroads, Venezuela ceased to pay sums it 
owed to a French investor, in the aftermath of a revolution, invoking force 
majeure.264 The umpire upheld the defense: “[the State’s] first duty was to 
itself. Its own preservation was paramount . . . the appeal of the company 
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/August 4, 1910, 11 RIIA 431 (1912)). 
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DELL’ARBITRATO INTERNAZIONALE 1, 12 (Milan Chamber of Arb. ed., 2011). 
 263. Interpretation of the Convention Between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Recip-
rocal Emigration (Greece v. Bulg.), Advisory Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 34–36 
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for funds came to an empty treasury or to one only adequate to the demands 
of the war budget.”
265
 
In the Lighthouse case, Greece requisitioned a lighthouse owned by a 
French company during World War I. The lighthouse was subsequently de-
stroyed by enemy action. The Tribunal upheld Greece’s claim of force 
majeure.266 In the Gill case, sudden and unforeseen action by rebels de-
stroyed the house of a British national residing in Mexico. The Commission 
held that failure to prevent or punish such destruction was imputable to 
Mexico. Nonetheless, in an obiter dicta, it stated that, 
there may be a number of cases, in which absence of action is not 
due to negligence or omission but to the impossibility of taking 
immediate and decisive measures, in which every Government may 
temporarily find themselves, when confronted with a situation of a 
very sudden nature. . . In those cases no responsibility will be ad-
mitted. . . 
This is because of governments’ genuine impossibility to take action.
267
 In 
RSM Production Corporation v. Central African Republic,268 the Arbitral 
Tribunal held that the armed conflict in the Central African Republic consti-
tuted force majeure, thus suspending RSM’s obligation.269 
Several commentators have proposed that the outbreak of the corona-
virus pandemic “potentially amounts to an unforeseen event or an irresisti-
ble force triggering a situation of force majeure.”270 According to the mayor 
of Manaus, a city in the Amazon, the pandemic put the city “well beyond” a 
state of emergency; it amounted to “a state of utter disaster  . . . like a coun-
try that is at war—and has lost.”
271
 He even compared the spread of the pan-
demic to a tsunami.
272
 Certainly, as the Director of the World Health Organ-
ization pointed out, “[t]he global spread of the virus has overwhelmed 
health systems, and caused widespread social and economic disruption. . . 
This pandemic is much more than a health crisis.”
273
 Force majeure does not 
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apply where “a circumstance render[s] performance more difficult or bur-
densome.”
274
 Concerning state contribution,
275
 it is clear that especially when 
the pandemic started, but also when it affected more and more countries, 
states did not have sufficient information to foresee the global spread of the 
pandemic and organize a comprehensive plan to fight the same.
276
 Therefore 
the COVID pandemic may constitute a force majeure. 
2.  Distress 
Distress is another circumstance precluding wrongfulness and relates to 
situations in which the state “has no other reasonable way”
277
 of saving the 
life of its population.
278
 To successfully plead the defense of distress, a state 
must also demonstrate that it did not contribute to the situation and that the 
selected course of action did not create a comparable or greater peril.
279
 In 
other words, in circumstances of distress, the state has “in these circum-
stances, the State organ admittedly has a choice, even if it is only between 
conduct not in conformity with an international obligation and conduct 




The existing threat posed by the coronavirus pandemic to the lives of 
state populations is uncontroversial: “the fate of the population is within the 
control of the central authorities.”
281
 As aptly pointed out by commentators, 
“whether the other requirements are likely to be met will depend on the par-
ticular measure adopted, its impact, and the particular circumstances.”
282
 
Moreover, it will ask “if the international obligation in question excludes the 




In conclusion, it seems that states could successfully invoke distress to 
justify conduct that would otherwise be in breach of international law if 
measures were adopted during the pandemic. 
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3.  Necessity 
The necessity defense is part of customary international law.
284
 Necessi-
ty historically accounts for an expression of self-defense and the “inherent 
natural right to self-preservation.”
285
 It is also codified in article 25 of the 
ILC Articles.
286
 To successfully plead necessity, a state must demonstrate 
that its act “is the only way for the state to safeguard an essential interest 
against a grave and imminent peril; and does not seriously impair an essen-
tial interest of the state or states toward which the obligation exists, or of the 
international community as a whole.”
287
 Necessity cannot be invoked “if the 
international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking ne-
cessity” or “if the state has contributed to the situation of necessity.”
288
 or “if 
the state contributed to the situation of necessity.”
289
 While “there is room 
for disagreement about the precise boundaries”
290
 of the necessity defense 
and its application in given cases, the International Law Commission con-




Necessity differs from force majeure. In cases of necessity, although the 
performance of an obligation remains possible, a state voluntarily violates 
the commitment to protect a vital interest in a grave and imminent peril.
292
 
In contrast, in cases of force majeure, the state’s will is irrelevant; the obli-
gation is materially impossible to perform.
293
 As Heathcote points out, “Like 
distress, necessity is a situation of relative impossibility;”
294
 nonetheless, it 
differs from distress as “necessity does not [necessarily] pertain to the safe-
guarding of human life.”
295
 
The survival of a state’s population
296
 and a fortiori the well-being of 
the international community constitutes an essential interest.
297
 The spread 
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of the coronavirus pandemic arguably amounts to a grave and imminent per-
il, a threat of harm to the world’s population. Preventing the spread of the 
pandemic not only does not impair a vital interest of other states but also 
enhances the protection of global public health. 
Addressing whether state measures are the only way to protect essential 
interest requires a comprehensive assessment of the measure. As Bjorklund 
argued, “as other alternatives will nearly always be available, such a strict 
interpretation of the requirement would seem to defeat any defence.”
298
 In 
LG&E v. Argentina, the Tribunal concluded that the economic recovery 
package adopted by Argentina was the only way to respond to the financial 
crisis. The fact that there could be other means, in theory, did not deny the 
fact that a comprehensive response was needed in practice and that the state 
had no choice but to act.
299
 The Tribunal concluded that while Argentina 
may have had several responses at its disposal, this did not preclude necessi-
ty, the need to act.
300
 
As to the non-contribution criterion, arbitral tribunals have adopted di-
verging interpretations. For some tribunals, “well-intended but ill-conceived 
policies”
301
 exclude reliance on the plea.
302
 Other tribunals have held that on-
ly fault can exclude necessity.
303
 Some could argue that states’ underfunding 
of health care systems may potentially preclude reliance on necessity. But 
the argument proves too much, as countries have faced budgetary con-
straints after the financial crisis, and the coronavirus pandemic represents an 
unprecedented circumstance that has deeply affected even the most ad-
vanced health care systems. 
The relationship between treaty exceptions and defenses under custom-
ary international law has been discussed in a number of arbitrations in the 
aftermath of Argentina’s financial crisis. According to the CMS Annulment 
Committee, the essential security provision of investment treaties is a sepa-
rate defense from the necessity defense under customary international 
law.
304
 In case of a conflict between a treaty exception and a customary law 
defense, “the application of the lex specialis principle will point to the more 
particular or more special rule.”
305
 Therefore, the treaty standard should be 
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taken as the primary basis of reference. This approach is not only conceptu-




The number of cases arising in the aftermath of the Argentine economic 
crisis demonstrates that arbitral tribunals reluctantly weighted human rights 
considerations in the adjudication of economic crisis-related disputes, focus-
ing instead on the economic dimension. The coronavirus pandemic now 
challenges this traditional interpretive stance, as it requires full use of the 
flexibilities that international investment law offers. The nature of the crisis 
caused by the pandemic is different from any economic crisis. In the case of 
an economic crisis, one could argue that such a crisis was triggered by a 
state’s own actions or omissions. But this pandemic is different. In finding a 
balance between commitment and flexibility, arbitral tribunals should per-
mit flexibility in relation to good faith measures adopted in new and unfore-
seen circumstances, while foreclosing purely opportunistic treaty breaches. 
4.  Rebus Sic Stantibus 
The inherent tension between continuity and change characterizes the 
development of international law. On the one hand, one of the fundamental 
pillars of international law is the basic rule that treaties must be complied 
with, pacta sunt servanda.307 Treaty stability enables the predictability, cer-
tainty, and rule-based development of international relations. On the other 
hand, the principle that a fundamental change of circumstances enables der-
ogation from, or suspension of, treaty obligations, rebus sic stantibus, ex-
presses “considerations of justice, particularly when compliance with treaty 
obligations becomes overly burdensome.”
308
 
The principle of change of circumstances is one of the fundamental 
principles of international law.
309
 If a fundamental change of circumstances 
has occurred after the signing of a treaty, that the parties could not have ex-
pected at the time of the negotiations, the contracting States may invoke the 
principle of change of circumstances in order to protect their legitimate in-
terests.
310
 Indeed, if the rights and obligations assumed by the contracting 
parties became seriously unbalanced and the treaty was still complied with, 
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Alberico Gentili (1552–1608), an Italian religious refugee and Regius 
Professor of civil law at the University of Oxford, was the first to translate 
the notion of rebus sic stantibus from canon law into the law of nations.312
Gentili acknowledged that the law of nations is dynamic and can be adapted 
to emerging needs.
313
While treaties should be respected, pacta sunt servan-
da, provided affairs remain in the same condition, rebus sic stantibus, Gen-
tili claimed that a fundamental change of circumstances could justify their 
breach.
314
For Gentili, if a term of a treaty became harmful or unjust, it 
should no longer be regarded as valid.
315
For instance, if a state promised 
help to an ally, but was assailed by so great a force that it could hardly 
maintain its own defense, it would no longer be bound to render aid.
316
The 
general clause did not belong to ancient Roman law; rather, it originated in 
medieval canon law, which tended to moderate the rigor of Roman private 
law with considerations of equity.
317
The civilians later adopted it, and Gen-
tili introduced it into international law, where it has remained to the present.
Other scholars, such as Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), rejected the ap-
plicability of a similar concept in international relations, as it could destabi-
lize the international order, jeopardize the foundations of the system, and 
alter the content of legal obligations.
318
In other words, for Grotius, the idea 
of rebus sic stantibus was a way to overturn the sanctity of contracts and an 
attempt to avoid compliance with international obligations and state respon-
sibility.
319
Nonetheless, because factual circumstances change, states have 
accepted the need to insert some flexibility into their international commit-
ments to maintain some equitable balance between their rights and obliga-
tions under international law.
As a consequence, the notion of rebus sic stantibus has become part of 
international law. The doctrine is part of customary international law and is 
restated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”).
320
Nonetheless, the VCLT poses a very high threshold for the de-
termination of whether a fundamental change of circumstances occurred, 
and only allows for the termination or suspension of a treaty.
321
It does not 
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include the renegotiation or adaptation of a treaty to the change of circum-
stances.
322
Therefore, scholars contend that the law of treaties does not ade-
quately accommodate change.
323
Because rebus sic stantibus suspends the 
functioning of a treaty, it has been rarely invoked in international law, and 
international courts have been cautious in interpreting the rebus sic stanti-
bus clause. The said courts view the rebus sic stantibus notion as an excep-
tion to the rule of pacta sunt servanda and generally interpret treaty excep-
tions restrictively.
324
Nonetheless, if the rebus sic stantibus doctrine is part of customary law 
and is well codified in treaty law, there is no reason to interpret such princi-
ple so restrictively as to make it impossible to apply. If it is part and parcel 
of the architecture of international law, there must be a powerful reason for 
its inclusion in the system. In the Summary Record of the 695
th
meeting of 
the International Law Commission, Elias recalled that “the Special Rappor-
teur had rightly decided in favour of including an article on the doctrine of 
rebus sic stantibus. . . for the very good reason that its omission might open 
the door to abuses or violations of international law.”
325
The rebus sic stan-
tibus doctrine can be compared to an emergency exit. None should use it in 
normal circumstances, but in case of an emergency—an earthquake, a ter-
rorist attack, or a pandemic—it would be unconscionable and ultimately un-
lawful not to open such an emergency exit, if needed.
Moreover, the rebus sic stantibus doctrine is common to a range of con-
stitutional traditions. For instance, in English common law, the doctrine of 
frustration applies where an unforeseen and unforeseeable event occurs after 
a contract has been concluded that makes a performance “radically differ-
ent” from what was agreed in the contract.
326
The German Civil Code also 
governs the consequences of a significant change in the circumstances form-
ing the basis of the contract.
327
Similar provisions appear in other civil law 
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 At the international level, article 6.2.2 of the UNIDROIT Princi-
ples of International Commercial Contracts (UPICC) deals with hardship, 
which occurs “where the occurrence of events fundamentally alters the equi-
librium of the contract” either because the cost of performing has increased 
or the value of the performance provided has been reduced.
329
  A party can 
invoke hardship for renegotiating the terms of the contract. 
There is no reason why the rebus sic stantibus principle could not be 
invoked by states facing a fundamental change of circumstances. Some in-
vestment contracts may specifically include it. Even if it was not mentioned 
in any contractual instrument, the principle belongs to customary law and 
may be invoked by states. The change in circumstances must be fundamen-
tal; “it has to jeopardize the survival of the state.”
330
 
In light of this, the call on the international community for an immedi-
ate moratorium on all arbitration claims by private corporations against 
governments and a permanent restriction on all arbitration claims related to 
government measures targeting health, economic, and social dimensions of 
the pandemic should be welcome. It expresses the principle of rebus sic 
stantibus while also attempting to bring international consensus on the mat-
ter. Such a call expresses the idea that “governments must direct their atten-
tion to the urgent control of the COVID-19 crisis” and “good faith recovery 
efforts.”
331
 It highlights the need to safeguard the states’ regulatory space to 
protect public health and prevent the risk that investor-state dispute settle-
ment proceedings affect states’ capacity to cover the health needs of their 
citizens and the health of nations more generally. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As with any branch of international law, international investment law 
and arbitration face the challenge of maintaining legal continuity, certainty, 
and stability while also accommodating unforeseen and special circum-
stances in individual cases and pursuing justice. COVID-19 constitutes an 
unprecedented crisis, and as leaders develop answers for the crisis now, we 
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must look to the past and the future. This article addressed the question of 
whether there can be a balance between legal stability and flexibility in in-
ternational investment agreements and in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribu-
nals. Rather than adopting a pro-state, or in the alternative, a pro-investor 
stand, this article suggests a moderate approach, arguing that there is poten-
tial for both continuity and change in international investment law and arbi-
tration. There is potential for continuity because of the vagueness of invest-
ment treaty provisions and the flexibilities that international law offers 
should be used to the fullest. There is potential for change in that the invo-
cation of flexibilities has not always worked well in the past.
The current crisis may provide the impetus for a comprehensive review 
of how the international investment regime navigates the impact of major 
unforeseeable events on existing investor-state relations. Is international in-
vestment law and arbitration legally well equipped to address change? As-
suring an appropriate dialectic between continuity and change can enable 
states to maintain a just balance of rights and obligations, not only at the 
time of the negotiation of a treaty, but also during the treaty’s lifespan. The 
article identifies three features of international investment law that can make 
it flexible to develop harmoniously with, and ideally contribute to, the evo-
lution of international law: the indeterminacy of international investment 
treaty law, its flexibilities, and the principle of fundamental change of cir-
cumstances.
First, the indeterminacy of international investment law and arbitration 
can enhance its legitimacy. International investment treaties include vague
treaty provisions. On the one hand, this constitutes a risk, because there is
uncertainty about how arbitral tribunals can interpret such provisions. On
the other hand, such vagueness can also constitute an opportunity, because it
provides inherent flexibility to international investment treaties. By adopt-
ing a holistic approach to treaty interpretation, arbitral tribunals can inter-
pret investment treaty provisions in light of general international law.
332
The
tribunals’ interpretation will be “crucial for an optimal balance between
commitment and flexibility and ultimately for the stability of the system.”
333
The fact that U.N. organs have defined COVID-19 as a threat to internation-
al peace and security should not be ignored by arbitral tribunals, as doing so
would create an unnecessary disconnect between the field of international
investment law from general international law.
Second, it is unnecessary to change investment law, but only to inter-
pret the existing flexibilities to the fullest. Any rights, including investors’ 
rights, are not absolute. Instead, they can come into conflict with other val-
ues such as public health. The settlement of such conflicts requires the bal-
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ancing of circumstances on a case-by-case basis. In balancing conflicting 
values, states have broad autonomy and can adopt different measures, in-
cluding measures even more stringent than those recommended by the 
World Health Organization. Arbitrators should control whether the pursued 
aim is legitimate, and whether there is a rational and reasonable causal rela-
tionship between the restriction of economic rights and the promotion of 
public health. The assessment must be objective.
334
 If, nonetheless, arbitra-
tors opt for a more stringent proportionality test—as some scholars argue,
335
 
but remain far from being a common practice in arbitral awards, at least for 
the time being—then a certain deference should be granted, as only the state 
can determine the level of public health protection they aim to ensure.
336
 If 
states feel that they have no flexibility to adopt crucial public health 
measures, they may exit given treaty regimes. Nonetheless, it would be bet-
ter that the system enables the full use of the flexibilities it offers, to main-
tain the unity of the international community in times of crisis.
337
 Instead, 
flexibility can be achieved not only through the adoption of specific excep-
tions in the text of treaties but also through a sensible interpretation of in-
vestment treaty provisions and customary law. 
Third and finally, the principle that a fundamental change of circum-
stances enables termination from, or suspension of, treaty obligations (rebus 
sic stantibus) expresses considerations of justice and equity infra legem. As 
such, it should not be considered to be an anathema to international law, but 
an important part of the same. The very architects of the international legal 
system embedded some flexibility in its foundations. Only some flexibility 
can enable the architecture of international law to withstand the passage of 
time and allow the international community to save lives and communities. 
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